The past 8 years have witnessed a reversal in American trade policy stance—away from fealty to multilateral trade rules and an embrace of openness towards a turn inward. Communication styles of the Biden and Trump teams differ but, broadly speaking, Biden continued many of Trump’s salient import restrictions.

American presidential elections are not known for advancing the cause of open trade and investment. This year was no exception. One candidate advocated 60% import tariffs on goods made in China and 10%-20% across-the-board duties on imports from everywhere else. His opponent labelled these proposals a “sales tax,” but that may have been driven more by the desire to deflect attention from the Biden Administration’s poor track record on inflation. During the campaign, the Biden Administration imposed sharp import tariff increases on electorally-sensitive products and discouraged the takeover of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel (a foreign firm based in an ally, Japan). Observers were left in no doubt that both candidates would take whatever measures were needed to prop up the under-performing elements of the American manufacturing sector—a consequence of many “Rust belt” states being electoral “swing states.”

Before the next US Administration takes office, America’s trading partners would be advised to consider how much access to the US market matters in practice. What is their export exposure should the United States turn further inward? Such assessments should consider the option of selling more to other countries. After all, the American share of world imports has fallen this century from 19.6% in 2000 to 13.5% today. This means that for decades export opportunities outside the United States have grown faster than world goods trade. An extensive table at the end of this briefing provides estimates on the export exposure of 187 of America’s trading partners.

Exposure analysis

The goal here is not to predict how restrictive the next US Administration’s policy towards imports will be. Nor is it to quantify the impact of any new American trade barriers. Rather, it is to put numbers on the exposure of trading partners to the loss of access to the United States market. To fix ideas, the focus here is on the worst-case scenario: where access to the American market is lost entirely for each trading partner, including those with regional trade agreements with the United States. Hopefully this worst-case won’t come about—but the findings reported below are revealing and may offer some comfort to many foreign governments. Given that international trade data on services is so patchy, only foreign goods trade is considered. A trading partner is less vulnerable to loss of access to the US market when:

1. A smaller share of its total exports is shipped to the United States.

2. Aggregate exports play a smaller role in its GDP.

3. Exports to destinations other than the United States are growing faster.

The first factor reflects the degree to which a trading partner’s exports are concentrated in the United States. The second factor reflects the overall export dependence of a trading partner. The third factor speaks to the track record in winning export orders in third markets and, therefore, to the trading partner’s potential for re-directing products previously destined to the United States.

Using international trade data from the UN COMTRADE database and GDP data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, the rest of this briefing examines these three elements. The goal is to put numbers on each of them so as to allow policymakers and analysts to scale what is at stake if American trade isolationism is pushed to the limit. 

Export concentration and dependence

The latest year for which a full set of international trade data is available in the UN COMTRADE database is 2022. For that year, a trading partner’s export concentration was calculated as the share of total national goods exports destined for the United States. Moreover, export dependence was calculated as the share of national GDP in 2022
accounted for by national goods exports.

Only Cambodia and Nicaragua lie inside the red zone, indicating the greatest exposure. For sure, Mexico is on the boundary. However, more nations are in the yellow zone—which implies they have relatively high levels of export concentration or export dependence but not both. Canada and Mexico have lower levels of export dependence than Thailand and Viet Nam but the exports of the former two are more heavily concentrated in the United States market. These findings are a reminder that, as far national economic exposure is concerned, exports are not the only source of demand for products.

Only 17 of the 187 economies considered here lie inside the yellow or red zones in Figure 1. Interestingly, trading behemoths such as China, Germany, and Japan do not lie inside either zone. Nor does the Republic of Korea for that matter. Attention now turns to the third factor—re-directing exports to third markets.

Track record of exporting to alternative markets

Rather than speculate as to capacity of a nation to re-direct lost US exports to third markets, the track record of each economy in winning export orders is considered. To assess the growth in non-US sales of an economies’ products, the annual cumulative growth rate of total non-US goods imports between 2012 and 2022 was calculated. Forty- three economies saw the nominal value of their non-US goods exports fall between 2012 and 2022 and for them there must be doubts as to whether, without additional measures being taken, lost US export sales could be profitably re-directed to third markets.

In the 144 economies that saw non-US imports grow from 2012 to 2022, it was possible to calculate the number of years it would take for non-US imports to grow so as to fully compensate for loss in US market access. For the sake of argument assume that the US market is entirely closed to imports at the start of 2025. For each of these 144 trading partners, it is possible to calculate in which year the growth in non-US imports would have compensated entirely for the loss of US market access in 2025.

Nine nations are in the red/danger zone: Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, Honduras, Ireland, Lesotho, Mexico, Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago. A further 10 nations are in the yellow zone: Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jordan, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. On the third metric then, these nations have the most to worry about if American market access is lost. The other 126 economies that expanded their non-US exports from 2012 to 2022 have less reason for concern: either their non-US exports are growing fast enough to quickly replace lost US exports, or their export dependence on the US market was small in the first place.

On the assumption that the US market is closed in 2025, that figure reports the number of economies whose non-US exports would have grown enough to replace the lost US sales by the end of each subsequent year.

By the end of 2025, 69 economies will have crossed that threshold—essentially replacing lost US sales with organic export growth elsewhere. A further 14 economies would reach that threshold by the end of 2026 and a further 9 economies by the end of 2027. Within 5 years of loss of US market access (2030), a total of 114 economies would have replaced all their lost US export sales. These findings do not imply that extreme US trade isolationism is unimportant—disruption is almost certain. However, for many economies these export losses would be readily absorbed through organic export growth in third markets.

[Regarding] which year total exports are made whole for the G20 trading partners of the United States, Australia’s exports would recover fastest—followed by China, which would see full recovery before the end of 2027. India and Germany would have to wait five years for full export recovery.

British and French exports to third markets have grown so slowly over the past decade (around 1% per annum from 2012 to 2022) that their full recovery would take place in 12 years, in 2037. The root causes of slow export growth to third markets merits further investigation as it influences the capacity to absorb closure of the US market. This observation applies not only to Britain and France but also to the 43 economies that did not enjoy export growth outside the US market in the decade from 2012 to 2022.

Other considerations to bear in mind

One concern with this analysis is that it only considers direct export exposure to the United States. What about those exports to Mexico that are used to make products for sale in the United States? Shouldn’t this be taken into account? Other than the United States, 8 nations exported more than $10 billion to Mexico in 2022 (Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, and Viet Nam.) China stands out in this regard—exporting a total of $118 billion to Mexico in 2022.

Let’s assume that all these exports to Mexico would also be lost if the US closes its market to foreign goods. Not every export to Mexico is used to produce goods for sale in the United States, so the results that follow will over-estimate the adjustment time needed. Table 1 reports the number of additional years of non-US export growth needed to replace the lost Mexican market access as well. Japan is excluded from this calculation as it is one of the economies where non-US exports did not grow from 2012 to 2022.

Based on 2022 trade flows, it would take between 0.3 to 2.2 years longer for these nations to recover their lost exports to Mexico as well. Viet Nam would need less than 4 months to make whole any lost Mexican exports. China would need just over 6 months to do so and Canada 15 months. At the upper end, in less than 27 months full recovery for the Republic of Korea would be achieved should organic growth to non-US markets continue at the same pace. Again, while a commercial blow of this nature is not to be trivialised, the inclusion of Mexico in the calculations does not materially affect the qualitative findings reported earlier […].

No doubt some will point out that exposure is not the same as effect. They might prefer to estimate or simulate the effects of full US market closure. Such calculations would be welcome but they come at a cost that should be recognised. The economic models available to conduct such empirical analysis lump together many developing economies into large groups. Therefore, those models cannot provide the type of granular evidence found in the Annex Table of this Briefing.

A third worry relates to the assumptions underlying the policy scenario explored here. Extreme US trade policy isolationism may trigger retaliation by other governments. Under these circumstances the rate of growth of non-US exports witnessed during 2012 to 2022 may overstate the likely growth rate should America’s trading partners close their markets too.

Retaliation is likely to extend the time to full export recovery. But a countervailing factor is sustained decline in US competitiveness. If that decline continues (indeed, if exacerbated by further turns inward), then trading partners may experience faster growth in non-US markets than that witnessed from 2012 to 2022.

Bear in mind that the US share of world exports has fallen from 12.5% in 2000 to 8.8% in 2023. Moreover, the only remaining international competitiveness ranking reports that the United States was ranked 1st in 2015, 3rd in 2016 (the last ranking before the end of the Obama Administration), 10th in 2020 (the last ranking issued before the end of the Trump Administration) and 12th in 2024. This loss of ground surely translates into weaker US export performance and, correspondingly, into commercial opportunities for trading partners. Taking proper account of declining US competitiveness implies that the years-to-recovery estimates presented here may be too pessimistic.

A final consideration is that US trade isolationism would not be confined to closing its markets. There would be implications for the standing of the World Trade Organization, not least if the United States were to formally renounce its membership as well. It is difficult to see a silver lining in such a scenario.

Concluding remarks

The United States shepherded the world trading system after the Second World War. However, over the past 8 years, during Administrations of both parties, it has turned inward. The recent US presidential election confirmed little appetite from either party for meaningful, constructive engagement with foreign governments on international trade and investment policy. Whoever wins this election, the prognosis is for a further inward turn—and the trading partners of the United States should prepare accordingly.

Trading partners would be advised to assess their exposure to abrupt moves to end access to the United States market. The evidence presented in this briefing may be useful in this regard. While such abrupt moves would be unwelcome and possibly devastating for the standing of the current corpus of international trade rules, for many trading partners the lost exports would be recovered quickly with additional sales in third markets.

Having written that, there are some trading partners of the United States that would face major economic dislocation following denial of market access. The US trading partners at greatest risk go beyond Canada and Mexico, as the evidence in this briefing shows.

Cushioning the blow from America’s turn further inward provides another reason for governments to review their private sector development policies with an eye to enhancing international competitiveness. The temptation to resort to quick fixes (typically in the form of beggar-thy-neighbour subsidies) and to retaliation against any American moves should be resisted. The best insurance against rogue United States trade policy is an efficient, innovative and nimble private sector capable of securing new foreign customers.

Its declining competitiveness ranking and falling share of world exports are manifestations of the secular economic decline of the United States. Regrettable as that decline is, these same factors ease the adjustment of America’s trading partners to further turns inward by Washington, DC.

To read the full Zeitgeist Series Briefing as it appears on the Global Trade Alert website, click here.

To read the full report as a PDF, click here.

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In many ways, 2022 was a bad year for U.S. agricultural trade. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine cut off exports of wheat, sunflower, and other products from both countries. Mexico proposed banning imports of GMO corn from the United States. And the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) were both left trying to operate without anyone in charge of agricultural trade until late December when the Senate finally confirmed two highly qualified nominees. Although total agricultural exports did rise in 2022 to record levels, so did imports, which nearly exceeded exports. USDA projects that imports will fully overtake exports in 2023, which has only happened twice before in the past 50 years. These trends shape the costs of farm inputs and outputs, including food, fiber, livestock feed, and biofuels, and affect where and how agricultural production occurs. That, in turn, not only affects farmers’ bottom line and consumers’ pocketbooks, but the climate as well.

Every country and region produces agricultural goods with a different carbon footprint—that is, the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions generated per pound, bushel, or other unit of agricultural production. This is due to factors like fertilizer use, irrigation, and other farming practices; domestic policy support for agricultural innovation and production; and environmental conditions such as climate and soil quality. If trade policies shift production from a country with a high carbon footprint to one where production is more efficient, total global emissions could decrease, and vice versa. In fact, concentrating global crop production in optimal locations with high yields could decrease its carbon and biodiversity footprint by 71% and 87%, respectively.

Yet trade has not been a major focus of U.S. policy debates about how to decarbonize agriculture or otherwise improve environmental sustainability. Policy proposals have generally focused on other areas such as how to increase domestic adoption of no-till farming and other practices, limit agriculture’s land use footprint, and sustainably manage livestock operations. Only recently has Congress considered agricultural trade’s potential role in decarbonization. The 2021 FOREST Act, for instance, would limit U.S. imports of beef, soy, and other commodities originating from illegally deforested land. We show that agricultural trade and trade policy can play an even larger potential role in cutting agricultural global carbon footprint.

By analyzing data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on five of the world’s top agricultural exports—maize (corn), wheat, beef, pork, and chicken—we find that the United States produces several key commodities with a lower carbon footprint than other major exporters (defined as the countries that accounted for 80% of global export quantity for each product from 2015-2019). However, many countries with higher carbon footprints export more than countries with lower emissions. In many cases, exports are also growing most quickly in high-emissions countries. For example, while the United States produces beef and chicken with a smaller carbon footprint than Brazil, exports are growing at a much faster rate in Brazil than in the United States.

These findings suggest that policy makers should consider policies that concentrate production in countries with the lowest rates of agriculturally-driven deforestation and other land-use change, which is a large contributor to agriculture’s carbon footprint. In the United States, for example, Congress could pass policies, such as the FOREST Act, that require imports to be deforestation-free or to meet other minimum standards. The executive branch can act too, for instance by developing trade agreements that increase exports of goods the United States produces with a relatively low footprint.

What goods does the United States produce with the lowest relative carbon footprint?

For most agricultural goods examined, the carbon footprint per unit of production in the United States is below the average of other top exporting countries. For example, maize (corn) production in other top exporting countries is, on average, more than two and half times more emissions-intensive than in the United States. Although the other countries do better when it comes to emissions from input use (synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, organic fertilizer, fuel use, and crop protection), they generate eight and a half times more emissions from land-use change. This is in part because yields in the other countries are lower than in the United States—about 1/3 lower—meaning that more land must be converted from forest, grassland, and other native vegetation to farmland. It is also partially due to less strict land use restrictions in some other countries, including Brazil, and to the high carbon content of forestland converted to maize in some other countries, such as in Argentina.

For beef and chicken production, emissions from production and land use per kilogram (kg) of meat produced are substantially lower in the United States than in the other top exporting countries. On average, the carbon footprint of beef or chicken in other top exporting countries is more than two and three times higher, respectively. One key reason, as with maize production, is that production in the United States is generally more efficient than in other countries, raising animals to slaughter weight quickly so that less feed and thus less pasture, cropland, and land conversion is required to produce each kg of meat. The picture is different, however, for pork production. The United States, despite negligible land-use change emissions, produces pork with slightly (4.5%) higher emissions than the other top exporting countries.

International competitiveness and carbon footprints are not aligned

Although the United States has a relatively low carbon footprint for many agricultural exports, other countries with higher emissions often export more. If production and exports of agricultural products were concentrated in the countries with the smallest carbon footprints, total global emissions could be minimized. But export quantities and emissions intensities are not always aligned.

When it comes to the production of beef, chicken, and pork, the largest exporters from 2015-2019—Brazil (beef), Brazil (chicken), and the United States (pork)—don’t have the lowest carbon footprints. In fact, of the top exporting countries, Brazil’s beef production has the second highest emissions intensity when emissions from deforestation and other types of land-use change are accounted for. The emissions intensity of beef production in Brazil is over 50% higher than in Australia and almost two and half times greater than in the United States, the second and third largest exporters, respectively.

Brazil is also the largest exporter of chicken, despite having an emissions intensity that is almost 80% higher than chicken production in the United States, the second largest exporter. Ignoring land-use change emissions, chicken production in Brazil is relatively efficient and low-emitting. However, emissions from land-use change involved in producing soy and other feed for chicken far exceed those in the United States.

Of the top seven pork-exporting countries, which account for over 80% of global pork exports, the United States is the largest exporter and the fourth most emissions-intensive producer. For every kilogram of pork protein produced, the United States emits nearly 30% (or 12 kilograms carbon dioxide-equivalent) more than Germany, the second largest exporter, and over 82% (~23 kilograms carbon dioxide-equivalent) more than Canada, the third largest exporting country. This is partially due to high levels of methane emissions from the lagoons and pits predominantly used to store manure in the United States, as well as differences across countries in the crops used for feed.

Russia and the United States are the top two exporters of wheat but also have the highest rates of emissions from production among major exporters and some of the highest when including land-use change. Synthetic fertilizer use is largely responsible for the United States’ high carbon footprint; it is the source of over a third of U.S. wheat emissions, but only accounts for about 10% of Russia’s.

The picture is less clear for maize since just five countries—the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, and France—made up over 80% of global exports from 2015–2019, but emissions data from FAO-LEAP is unavailable for Brazil and land-use change data is unavailable for France. Nevertheless, the United States, which is the world’s top maize exporter, has a substantially lower carbon footprint than Argentina and Ukraine. Despite having the most emissions from inputs, particularly synthetic fertilizers, emissions from land-use change are relatively low in the United States. This is partially due to the high yields that fertilizers and other inputs and factors enable; U.S. maize yields in 2021 were more than twice as high as Brazil’s and about 50% higher than Argentina’s.

However, land-use change emissions for corn and other products in the United States are also generally low because the primary methods used by FAO and others to calculate emissions from land use change only consider recent land use-change. For instance, while Argentina has cleared land for corn and other crops recently, most U.S. farmland was cleared decades ago if not longer. Further research into the carbon footprint of agriculture and trade’s potential to reduce it must address this methodological shortcoming, for instance by estimating the marginal impact of new agricultural production.

The average emissions intensity of global agricultural trade is on track to increase

Unfortunately, export data from 2000 to 2019 reveals that, for many agricultural products, exports from countries with high emissions intensities are increasing more quickly than exports from countries with low emissions intensities. For example, compared to the United States, exports from Brazil have increased almost three times as quickly for beef, nearly three times as fast for chicken, and more than 22 times more quickly for maize. Likewise, growth in pork exports from the United States have outpaced exports from Germany and Canada.

To be clear, exports aren’t becoming more emission-intensive for all products. U.S. wheat exports fell from 2000 to 2019, while exports grew relatively quickly in countries with lower emissions intensities such as Russia, Canada, France, and Ukraine. Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dramatically affected agricultural production and trade, its 2022 wheat exports were estimated to be near record-high levels while U.S. exports have continued their long-term downward trend.

Nevertheless, the growth in exports from countries with relatively high carbon footprints could lead to a global rise in emissions. If this growth continues, the average carbon footprint of maize, pork, and beef exports in 2040 would be 18%, 3%, and 10% higher, respectively, than if current export patterns remained constant. The average emissions per unit of wheat and chicken, on the other hand, would decrease by around 11% and 7%. Total emissions embodied in these exports would lead to an increase in emissions of about 63 million tonnes CO2-equivalent. This is greater than all agricultural emissions from major farm states like Texas, Iowa or California.

Next steps: Policy and research to reduce the emissions from agricultural exports

Ultimately, location matters. Concentrating production and export of agricultural goods in countries with relatively low emissions intensities could reduce global agricultural emissions. But currently, the largest exporters are rarely the most climate-efficient exporters. And recent export trends don’t provide much reason for hope that international trade will correct course without several types of interventions.

First, trade officials, advocates, and other experts should raise awareness about the climate mitigation potential that lies in agricultural trade policy.

Second, researchers should examine several questions about the environmental impacts of agricultural trade that are key to informing policy. These include:

1. What are the impacts of increasing export of relatively low-carbon products on importing countries’ food systems? Increasing exports can affect the course of agricultural development in importing countries in a variety of ways including by undercutting domestic production.

2. What is the marginal climate impact of increasing exports? Our analysis relies on the estimates of the average carbon footprint of production in different countries. However, it is possible that in any given country, the next unit of production would be substantially more or less emissions-intensive than the average e.g. if new production involves deforestation or other land-use change.

3. How can subnational differences in emissions be leveraged? For instance, if one region of a country produces beef with a lower footprint than other regions, are there ways to concentrate future export growth in that region?

4. What are the non-climate tradeoffs of increasing exports? While reducing GHG emissions is critical, other types of environmental impacts such as nutrient pollution and resource use such as water use must be considered too.

Third, policy makers should consider different trade policies to shift agricultural production and exports from high emissions to low emissions countries. One option is to incorporate agricultural products into a renewed WTO Environmental Goods Agreement that aims to reduce tariffs for environmentally beneficial products. Countries should also examine how reducing trade barriers through bilateral or multilateral agreements could lower emissions. For instance, China applies a greater tariff on U.S. beef than on beef from Australia and several other countries with more emissions-intensive beef than the United States. Negotiating reductions on the tariffs on U.S. beef could therefore reduce the carbon footprint of Chinese beef imports. It could, however, also spur increased beef consumption, negating some of the climate benefits. These calculations, therefore, warrant careful study.

Likewise, the United States and other major exports should examine how trade promotion programs can be used to expand international demand for exports that replace higher-carbon products. For example, promotion of U.S. beef could reduce global agricultural products if it displaces other countries’ imports of higher-carbon beef. Providing additional support to companies and industries seeking to export goods produced using climate-smart practices could further enhance the climate benefits. Currently, U.S. Department of Agriculture trade programs, such as the Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development Program (FMD), do not take into account the carbon footprint, or other environmental impacts, of products.

Finally, governments should continue aiming to reduce the carbon footprint of production within countries using a wide variety of policy instruments. For example, public investment in agricultural research is critical to developing technologies and practices that cut emissions and boost yields, which is important for reducing land use change. Reducing trade barriers for productivity-enhancing and emissions-reducing technologies can also help producers across the world adopt more climate-friendly practices. Likewise, investments from high-income countries in international research and other agricultural development efforts in lower-income countries can enhance their productivity and environmental footprint.

Ultimately, reducing the agricultural sector’s greenhouse gas emissions is a pressing challenge, and, given the interconnectedness of our food system, it demands global solutions that can account for international trade. To achieve global agricultural emissions reductions, policymakers should consider a wide range of trade policy options and researchers should aim to provide them with the data, analysis, and tools needed to make more informed decisions.

To read the full report, please click here.

Dan Blaustein-Rejto is the Director of Food & Agriculture at the Breakthrough Institute. His work examines how public policy can support environmentally and socially beneficial agricultural innovations such as methane-reducing cattle feeds and alternative proteins. Dan has led multi-stakeholder projects to identify technical options to decarbonize agriculture, assess federal policy gaps and opportunities, and build coalitions to advance climate-smart agriculture.

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Planet Tracker set out to identify those territories and countries which are dependent on nature for export trade revenues. To do so, natural resource-based exports are defined rather narrowly, excluding ecotourism and similar non-physical contributions to a nation’s wealth and trade.

This is not to say that experiential values from the environment do not have value. In fact, for some nations, ecotourism is a substantial source of foreign currency. Rather, we are interested in the dependency of nations specifically on physical goods traded in the international market. These are goods which are often inputs to other production processes and any shocks to global markets will be experienced by their producers first and then reverberate through the rest of the global supply chain.

The forms of natural capital are then further divided into renewables such as agricultural, forestry and seafood products, and non-renewables such as oil and gas, minerals, metals and ores. This division occurs because the dynamics of renewable versus non-renewable resources – the decision-making processes involved – tend to be different in many respects.

The definition of export dependency on nature is based on trade data covering 5,000 different product categories which are then sorted into whether they are directly dependent on natural capital. We recognize that all goods are at least partially dependent on nature. To make the approach actionable, we establish cut-off points. A product which is processed but remains almost entirely made of materials that are harvested from nature, e.g. soybean oil extracted from the seeds of the soybean, is classified as nature dependent. Where a product is changed physically or chemically in a way that makes the product significantly different from its original form, e.g. limestone, marl and clay which are converted into cement, it is excluded.

Following this logic, all complex manufactured goods coming from, for example, the chemical, plastic or machinery industries are excluded. The results are then aggregated to arrive at the percentage by value of each nation’s total exported goods that are directly dependent on nature. Their production and export and the relationship to a nation’s stability are of primary interest in this study. As all nations’ exports are at least in part dependent on nature, we use the term Nature Dependency of Exporters, alternatively Nature Dependent Exporters (NDEs) based on their level of natural resource exports and classify countries into high (HNDE), medium (MNDE) and low (LNDE) groups.

Having established NDE groups, for both renewable and non-renewable resources, Planet Tracker then compares the data using a set of common characteristics. Of primary interest, we explore whether there is a typical profile of HNDEs, exploring what characteristics they may have in common, using twelve metrics and a holistic, exploratory method to discover similarities.

By Filippo Grassi: Data Analyst, Planet Tracker. Dr. Zachary Turk: Visiting Fellow, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science; Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Agrar- und Umweltwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Rostock. Professor Ben Groom: Dragon Capital Chair in Biodiversity Economics, Land, Environmental Economics and Policy (LEEP) Institute Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School; Visiting Professor Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment London School of Economics and Political Science. John Willis: Director of Research, Planet Tracker.

To read the original report by Planet Tracker, click here.

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